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SYMPOSIUM COMMENTARY

COMPETITION POLICY IN BRAZIL
AND MERCOSUR: ASPECTS OF THE
RECENT EXPERIENCEt
Gesner Oliveira*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The last decade has been characterized by the dissemination of competition laws throughout various jurisdictions, particularly in developing countries. According to the 1997 Unctad
World Investment Report,' more than seventy nations now
have competition laws, in contrast with less than forty in the
1980s.
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t This paper was distributed at the Brazilian Antitrust Roundtable Symposium held in Miami, U.S.A.
* Gesner Oliveira is President of CADE (Brazilian Competition Agency) and
Professor of Economics at Getilio Vargas Foundation. The author expresses his
appreciation to Marcelo Nishimoto, Evelyn Celso, Cesar Mattos, Thomaz Jensen,
and colleagues at CADE for comments and discussion. All the opinions expressed
in this paper are the author's entire responsibility and do not reflect the official
positions of CADE.
1. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 1997: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND

COMPETITION POLICY 290, U.N. Sales No. E.97.11.D.10 (1997).
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Table 1 shows that such development has been particularly intense in Eastern" Europe. Table 2 illustrates that a new
wave of competition laws is taking place in the 1990s, involving a larger number of countries than at the turn of the century and during the immediate postwar period.
TABLE 2

NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS
PERIOD

COUNTRIES

1890-World
War II

United States, Canada, and Australia.

After World
War l

Germany, European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden,
France, Brazil (1962), Argentina, Spain, Chile, Colombia,
Thailand, India, South Africa, and Pakistan.

1980- 1990

Kenya, Sri Lanka and Korea.

1990Present

Russian Federation, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, Jamaica,
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Ivory Coast, Bulgaria,
Kazakstan, Poland, and initiatives in many other countries.

SOURCE. Roger Alan Boner &Reinald Krueger, Tle Bask&efAninetFolicy.A &Rew
of TenNations and tw &uropean Commaunifies, 23 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 16D,
1991).

Tables 1 and 2 show that competition policy becomes more
important with globalization, and not the contrary, as is sometimes argued. Notwithstanding the radically different historical contexts, competition policy tends to gain increasing importance in developing countries.
The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of
competition policy in Brazil and MERCOSUR. Section II proposes an ideal timetable for the implementation of competition
policy in a developing country.
Section III puts more than three decades of the Brazilian
experience in historical perspective, and discusses the present
agenda. Section IV provides a brief description of the discussions about competition policy in MERCOSUR with emphasis
on the Fortaleza Protocol. Section V points out the priorities
for Brazil and MERCOSUR over the next few years.
II. A TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION
POLICY

OF COMPETITION

The implementation of competition policy requires time,
cultural change, and investment in adequate institutions.
Therefore, it is not surprising that competition laws and enforcement vary widely across countries.
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Despite the historical nature of competition policy, it is
useful for analytical purposes to identify the sequence of evolutionary stages that could serve as a reference for comparisons
among different countries.
There are two extreme positions to be avoided when implementing competition policy in emerging economies. The first
position to avoid is to implement the policy so slowly that the
necessary changes do not occur. Indeed, lack of competition can
make other reforms such as privatization and deregulation less
effective, aside from creating difficulties for subregional integration.
The second position to avoid is to try to implement the
policy too quickly and without the necessary attention to the
peculiarities of the country, and most importantly, to the limited budgetary resources. Overactive and underfunded competition agencies might end up creating additional transaction
costs to the private sector, rather than helping the market.
The above considerations demonstrate the importance of
defining priorities and setting a plan for institutional building.
Table 3 contains a useful timetable to serve as a reference for
governments.
TABLE 3

TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION
POLICY
STAGE

NATIONAL

MULTILATERAL

Institutional
Maturity

I

11

III

Advocacy

+

+

+

2. Repression
of Horizontal
Agreements

4. Merger
Control
+
. Vertical
Agreements

6. Regulation
+
7.International
Cooperation
Agreements

8. Second Generation
International
Agreements
+
9. Pro-Active
Competition
Advocacy

1. Competition I

3. Technical
Assistance

REGIONAL

III

H

1

LEVELI

Harmonization Transformationof Antidumping into
CompetitionPolicy
Agenda
Core Principles
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The proposed sequencing is based on a simple idea inspired by Khemani and Dutz.2 The agency should start with
the actions that will most likely benefit the market and gradually introduce measures that require more a sophisticated
cost/benefit analysis.
A.

The Four Stages of InstitutionalDevelopment

It is possible to identify nine lines of action distributed in
four stages of implementation of competition policy.
Stage I:
At the beginning, the competition agency should focus on
three lines of action:
i) competition advocacy;
ii) horizontal agreements with emphasis on price cartels; and
iii) technical assistance from other agencies and multilateral
organizations.

Stage II:
In addition to the lines of action in Stage I, the following
points should be introduced:
iv) merger review system; and
v) control over vertical arrangements.
Both require careful examination, because they usually involve
costs and benefits. The impact upon social welfare is not easily
calculated.

2. R. Shyman Khemani & Mark Dutz, The Instruments of Competition Policy
and Their Relevance for Economic Development, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16, 31 (Claudio Frishtak ed., 1995); R.
Shyman Khemani, Competition Policy and Economic Development, in POLICY OPTIONS 23, 26-27 (1997).
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Stage III
In addition to the previous points, two lines of action
should be introduced, both requiring a great effort in terms of
inter-institutional coordination.
vi) cooperation with the regulatory agencies; and
vii) cooperation with competition agencies of other countries.
The difference between points vii) and iii) is that at later
stages of institutional development, there should be a greater
concern with the harmonization of practices and the conceptual
framework on a more bilateral basis, as opposed to the mere
technical assistance of Stage I.
Stage IV
Institutional maturity is achieved when, in addition to the
previous lines of action:
viii) the agency is able to coordinate with agencies of other
national jurisdictions in order to enforce the extraterritoriality clause; and
ix) the culture of competition is sufficiently disseminated so
that it is possible to implement a pro-active competition advocacy.
The difference between i) and ix) is that, at the earlier
stages, competition advocacy should focus on less ambitious
tasks, such as the mere explanation to the private community
of the elementary characteristics of competition law and the
need to change its attitudes toward antitrust matters. This is
particularly important for regions which have had a long history of state intervention such as Eastern Europe and Latin
America.
In contrast, pro-active competition advocacy means a more
pervasive role of the competition agency in giving opinions
about competitive impacts of various types of legislation. Analogously, with the environmental issues in more mature jurisdictions, one would expect competition matters to be taken into
consideration in an increasing number of areas.

470
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The stages suggested in Table 3 are organized according to
the degree of difficulty that authorities face in undertaking
cost/benefit analysis of the impact of competition measures.
Merger review comes after conduct control because the welfare
effect of a merger might be less clear than that of a price cartel, the latter being unequivocally welfare reducing.
However, it might well be the case that legally sound repression of price cartels may be more difficult than the implementation of a merger review system. In fact, it is generally
easy to assess the microeconomic impact of a cartel, but it is
hard to fulfill the requirements for an acceptable standard of
proof for the courts.
B. The Regional and MultilateralLevels
1. Competition Policy and the Regional Blocks
The agenda of the regional blocks has usually dealt with
two issues. First, the harmonization of the national competition laws, which includes the creation of a new legal framework in certain countries. Such is the case of some of the Eastern European nations.
Second, the member states have to negotiate the transformation of the anti-dumping rules into competition ones. This is
not a trivial question, either theoretically or politically, but it
is one that has to be addressed in order to stimulate trade
within the bloc.
2. Competition Policy and the WTO
Such transformation does not seem to be realistic at the
present world level. Any kind of international code or legislation in competition seems to be premature, given the wide
diversity of experiences and stages of development of the members of the WTO.
The definition of general guidelines with regard to the
prerequisites that a national law has to provide legal certainty
to private agents seems to be the relevant agenda at the multilateral level. It would be useful to establish what the WTO
considers to be the core principles of competition policy.
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C. Globalization and Competition Sequencing
Note that countries do not necessarily follow the sequence
suggested in Section II.A. Indeed, due to the many different
historical circumstances it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to find a single country that applied Table 3. And yet, the
latter continues to serve as a useful reference for competition
authorities.
Analogous to the industrialization process, the more recent
experience with competition policy, the faster the
national
the
pace of implementation of the sequence of stages indicated in
Table 3 and/or the more frequent the overlapping among those
phases, making the sequence converge towards a simultaneous
implementation.

III. ASPECTS OF THE BRAZiLIAN EXPERIENCE
The discussion of Section II is useful to examine the Brazilian experience. Despite some difficulties, Brazil has had an
impressive development in competition policy in comparison
with other emerging economies.
In terms of the sequence proposed in Table 3, Brazil has
completed most of the lines of action of Stages I and II and is
now entering Stage III. However, Section 3B reveals the need
to consolidate some relevant points of the earlier stages. Given
the rapid integration with the global economy, as pointed out
in Section 2C, the acceleration will coincide with the undertaking of the new agenda of Stage III, as discussed in Section 3C.
Before turning to those discussions, it is useful to provide an
overview of the Brazilian legislation in competition policy.
A. An Overview of the BrazilianSystem
Considering the high degree of state intervention during
the greater part of the import-substitution industrialization of
the twentieth century, the Brazilian legislation in competition
is precocious. CADE was created back in 1962 and has already
acquired some tradition.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 contain the relevant information. Table 4
shows the two distinct trends in the legislation dealing with
market regulation in Brazil, as well as in many other developing countries.
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RuLING THE MARKET IN BRAZIL: TWO

MAJOR

TRENDS
TRENDS
LEGISLATION

REFERENCE

AGENCY

& DATE

PROTECTION
OF POPULAR

TRANSITION COMPETITION
POLICY

ECONOMY
oo.o69
Nov18 1938
DL No. 7666
"Law Malaia"
June22,1945
Lu.

C.F'. 1937i, art.

141

Lex No. 1521
Dec. 26,1951
Lex No. 1522
Dec. 26,1951

Administrative
Council for
Economic Defense
(CADE)

Federal
Connission of
Supply and Prices
(COFAP)
Administrative
Council for
Economic Defense
(CADE)
National
Superintendency
of Supply
(SUNAB)

Lex No. 4137
Sept. 10, 1962

C.F. 1946, art
148

Lex No. 4
Sept. 26,1962

C.F. 1946, art.
146

DL No. 52025
May20,1963
Decreto No.
63196
Aug. 20,1968
DL No. 92323
Jan. 20,1968

Regulates Law
No. 4137
C.F. 1967, art
Interministerial
83, II Revoked on Council of Prices
Apr.25,1991
(CIP)
Revokes DL No.
52025 Regulates
Law No. 4137
National
Secretariat of
Economic Law
(SNDE)
Return to the
configuration of
ects
against
economic order as
crimes

DL No. 99244
May 10, 1990
Lex No. 8137
Dec. 27,1990

Lex No. 8158
(M P No. 204/90)
Jan. 9.1991
Lex No. 8884
Jun.11, 1994

Lex No. 9021
Mar. 30, 1995
Lex No. 9069
Jun.29,1995
Lex No. 9470
Jul. 10, 1997

Secretariat of
Economic Law
(SDE)
Transforms CADE
in autarchy

C.F. 1988, art.
170 and 173
Implementation
of the autarchy
created by Law
No. 8884/94
Alters Law No.
8884/94
Increases
paragraph to the
art. 4th. of Law
,No. 8884/94
1
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The first is characterized by significant direct intervention
in the market for the purpose of protecting the so-called "popular economy." As shown in Table 4, this type of legislation
dates back to the 1930s. It is a corollary of the state intervention in other areas of the economy.
Indeed, when import tariffs were high, subsidies prevailed
in many sectors, and government regulated the most important
macro prices, it was natural that prices had to be controlled.
This trend was predominant until the late 1980s, as indicated
in Table 5.
TABLE

5

MAIN PERIODS OF MARKET REGULATION IN BRAZIL
PERIODS
1937- 1988

1989- 1994

ENDS

1994Present

PROTECTION
OF
POPULAR
ECONOMY
COMPETITION
POLICY

TRANSITION
PERIOD

.C-

Three important changes occurred thereafter:
i) a significant trade liberalization program bringing import
tariffs down from an average of more than 50% to approximately 13% and eliminating several non-tariff barriers;
ii) privatization and deregulation of a number of important
sectors of the economy; and
iii) lastly, a stabilization plan in the period 1993-94 that
succeeded in coping with the four-digit inflation process
which had undermined the macro performance of the country
since the late 1970s.
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After the transitional period indicated in Table 5, those
changes made the "protection of the popular economy" anachronistic and the second trend of legislation became predominant
(see Table 5).
Table 6 compares the three most important pieces of legislation in competition policy since 1962. In June of 1994 the
Law 8884 was passed, introducing a few changes more in line
with the international trends in antitrust regulation:
i) CADE was given more autonomy from the central administration, and its members gained a fixed two-year term renewable once; and
ii) the merger review system was perfected in a number of
ways and was put in practice for the first time.
TABLE 6

BRAZILIAN COMPETITION LAWS SINCE 1962

LAW

Competition
BodiesBoie
Scope

Degree of
Autonomy

No. 4137 No. 8158

No. 8884

(1962)

(1991)

(1994)

CADE

SNDE

CADE

CADE

SEAE
SDE

Conduct

Structure

Conduct

CADE becomes
an independent
agency; CADE
members have a
two-year
mandate

B. The Need to Consolidate Stages I and II
In contrast to the majority of the emerging economies,
Brazil already has a reasonable number of administrative
decisions, especially in the recent period.
Table 7 shows the evolution of the number of decisions per
month. In 1997 the average number of decisions per month
was roughly seventeen times that of the previous commission
in 1994-96. More than half of all CADE decisions were taken
in the last twenty months.
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NUMBER OF CADE DECISIONS PER MONTH
150.0
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140

120
100
tO0
80
60.

41.0

30A
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2

1.4
196-1990

1.0

2.3

1992-1994 ti.94-MNb.99 lMy96-D 96 ki.97-NNv.7

D-97

SOURCE: CADE

However, those statistics should not lead to an underestimation of the importance of the early experience of CADE.
Indeed, one can find a rich doctrinal debate, as well as a few
useful precedents for most classic types of horizontal and vertical agreements. It is also noteworthy that a professional community dedicated to antitrust developed in a few cities of the
country.
Table 8 provides information about the composition of the
decisions breaking it down to conduct and merger cases. Numerically, there is now a predominance of conduct cases vis-Avis merger review cases; the latter represented 39% of the total
in the first two years of implementation under the new law, as
opposed to 11% in the last twenty months. This excessive emphasis on merger cases involving detriment of conduct seems
to have occurred in other jurisdictions and may be attributed
to various factors discussed elsewhere.

BROOK. J. INTL L.

476

TABLE 8

[Vol. XXV:2

COMPOSITION OF CADE DECISIONS:
VERSUS STRucTuRE DURING 1994-1997

CONDUCT

543 (89)

56 (100%)
34 (61%)
22 (39%)
0.

65 (11%y)

, aWAMqtM0' OADMMMTIVMC 1
j0&
E.N

Q

TO,

AD

W

AD=

SOURCE: CADE

Table 9 shows that the composition of the conduct cases
reveals what could be considered an old-fashioned feature of
the Brazilian system. The high percentage of "abusive price"
cases suggests the frequency with which authorities in the past
tried to use the competition law to repress what was perceived
as an abuse, but very often was a macro result of the inflationary process.
TABLE 9

TYPES OF CONDUCT CASES
BID RIGGING
3%
OTERS

TIED SALE
3%

SOURCE: CADE

ABUSIVE PRICE
24%

PREDATORY
PRICING
4%
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The vast majority of the conduct cases in the recent period
have been terminated without the imposition of any penalties.
In most cases the evidence was not sufficient to continue the
prosecution, and elementary aspects of the due process of law
were not respected. Two points derive from this:
i) in countries with a history of strong state intervention this
may be frequent, as well as desirable. In fact, the termination
of a number of old cases is positive to the extent that previous arbitrary state actions are no longer causing uncertainty.
This is particularly true in regard to numerous cases involving privatized companies which were continuously under
investigation until last December;3 and
ii) it is urgent to build an investigative capacity for which
material, and especially human resources are badly needed.
With regard to mergers some results are noteworthy:
* compared to other developing countries, the number of
decisions (87) as well as the content of the rulings already
reveal some accumulated experience;
9 as Table 10 shows, the rate of disapproval in 1994-97 is
relatively low and not much different from more mature
jurisdictions (6%);
e as Table 11 shows, most of the transactions are undertaken
by foreign companies; and
• most of the acquisitions involve Brazilian companies, as
illustrated by Table 12.

3. Table 19, infra contains a list of the relevant cases.
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MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BY TYPE OF DECISION
TABLE 10
June 1994 - March 1996
approved w/performance commitment 41% (9)
partiallynot approved 9%(2)

--

totally not approved 5%(1)
others 45% (10)

May 1996 - December 1997
approved 78% (51)
approved w/performance commitment 12% (8)
approved w/ performance commitment w/ strong
conditions 5%(3)
others 5% (3)

SOURCE: CADE

TABLE 11

MERGERS
CAPITAL

AND

ACQUISITIONS

BY

June 1994 - March 1996
national 36% (8)

b

foreign 64% (14)

May 1996 - December 1997
national 17% (11)
1foreign

SOURCE: CADE

83% (54)

ORIGIN

OF
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MERGERS

AND ACQUISITIONS

BY TYPE
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OF

OPERATION
June 1994 - March 1996
acquisition 45% (10)
incorporation 32% (7)
joint venture 917(2)
others 14% (3)

May 1996 - December 1997
acquisition 86% (56)
incorporation 0%(0)
joint venture 97o(6)
others 5% (3)

SOURCE: CADE

One of the major difficulties with merger control in Brazil
is the fact that most of the operations are notified a posteriori,
a possibility permitted by the Brazilian law. In more than 95%
of the cases, CADE examines the merger only after the fact,
which makes it much more costly for the authority to challenge
the transaction. Although a change in the law on this particular point will be necessary in the future, a more serious problem is the relatively long period of time that has been required
on average to analyze a merger.
In order to speed up the decision process, a change in
regulation was introduced in 1996 through Resolution 5. Tables 13, 14 and 16 compare the systems before and after Resolution 5. The basic idea was to create a fast-track procedure for
cases, which can be considered simple and are most likely to be
approved.
One of the peculiarities of the Brazilian system as shown
in Table 6 is that two different secretariats-SDE (Secretary
for Economic Regulation) and SEAE (Secretaria de
Accompanhamento Economico [Economic Monitoring Office]-give opinions before the CADE decision is taken. Thus,
increasing efficiency requires better coordination among CADE
and the two other institutions.
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MERGER REVIEW BEFORE RESOLUTION No. 5
I

Article 54 Acts and Contracts

1

L

-nt

I

Resolution

Requirement to SDFJMJ
!

"0"

No. 1/95

TAcc

O

Technical Opinion in 30 days

Technical Opinini

0dy

-a-

I

Tot

J
40-

TABLE 14

-0-

MERGER REVIEW AFTER RESOLUTION No. 5
CD:and SEAE

<-

SDE publishes report

Resoluion
[
Resolution

suppliers and clients)
(competitors

No. 596

SMeeting with
CADE, SDE and SEAE

YES

Isthr Cnsensus?

I

SDE
and SEAE
by
Analyss

CAEinshortd-n
b
Apreiaio

f

~fl~____

NO

with
ore
information
analyss
about
the operation
and SEAE
SDE
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i-the instruction
Reporter-Co
by

I

Appreciation ME
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RESOLUTION No. 1 VERSUS RESOLUTION No. 5:
SPEEDING UP THE DECISION PROCESS

T

605

SEAE

SDE

OBEFORE RES. #5

CADE

O3RESOLUTION #5

TOTAL

ELEGAL TERM

SOURCE: CADE
TABLE 16
BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RESOLUTION Nos. 1
AND 5

Resolution No. 1
IsolatedSequentialAnalysis
SEAE

SDE

CADE

Resolution No. 5
IntegratedRapidAnalysis

*

°m.
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Table 15 presents the results obtained. The average time
required to examine operation declined from 605 days to 204
days. Despite the significant improvement, a seven-month
period is definitely unsatisfactory given the pace of the economic decision process. Measures to cope with this problem are
discussed in the final section.
C. EnteringStage III
In addition to consolidating the lines of action of Stages I
and H, Brazilian authorities have to prepare for the new challenges of a new model of development different from the old
import substitution model and integrated in a global economy.
Two lines of action are particularly important in this new
context, as pointed out in Table 3:
* privatization and the coordination between competition and
regulatory authorities; and
e cooperation with the other national jurisdictions.
1. Competition Policy, Privatization and Re-Regulation
Table 17 illustrates the major phases of the Brazilian
privatization program. Although it began in the 1980s, the
program only became important after 1991, when major state
companies were transferred to the private sector.
TABLE 17

STAGES

OF THE

PROGRAM
1981-89

BRAZILIAN

1991-95

I

l

I,
I
I

I
I
I

PRIVATIZATION

1995 - Present

Re - Privatization [[
Several Sectors
Steel,
Petrochemicalsand
Fertilizers
New Frontiers:
Infrastructure / Public
Services
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CADE analyzed some of these operations in light of Law
8884. Table 18 describes the major steps of the privatization of
a firm. As with the private sector operations, the exam is typically made a posteriori. It is only after the firm is already
privatized that the competition aspects of the transaction are
scrutinized.
TABLE 18

COMPETITION
OPERATIONS

ANALYSIS

OF PRIVATIZATION

Enterpriseenters the
PrivatizationPNqrwn

Constitutional
Articles 170,173,

.

Announcen ent
Sell

LawNo.
8884194

*

:

Decree No.

S

:

1204194

GO..CAD C

Such a system could be improved with greater cooperation
between competition and privatization authorities in the design of the steps previous to the final sale to the private sector.
This has been achieved in the recent period through an operational agreement between BNDES and CADE.
Table 19 illustrates the list of privatization operations
examined by CADE. As mentioned before, a number of cases
have been terminated in the recent period diminishing uncertainty of private investors.
TABLE 19

PRIVATIZATION OPERATIONS SUBMITTED TO CADE

COMPANY
Carafba Metais Carafba
Fosfdrtil e Ultrafdrtil
Petroflex
Cia. Nacional de Alcalis
Usiminas
Copesul
Poliolefinas
CBE
CSN
Polisul
Nitriflex
Acesita
PPH
Ferrovia Centro-Atlntica
Malha Sudeste
Ferrovia Sul-Atlantica
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce

NUMBER
AC 29/95
AC 02/94
020260/94-11
020256/94-44
01593294-59
02025294-93
020253/94-56
020254194-19
020255/94-81
020259/94-32
020257/94-15
02025/94-84
020261/94-84
AC 95/96
AC 108/96
AC 115/97
AC 155/97

STAGE
returned to SDE
approved under conditions
terminated
terminated
returned to SDE
under analysis
terminated
terminated
terminated
terminated
terminated
terminated
terminated
under analysis
under analysis
under analysis
under analysis
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Since 1995, the privatization program has included sectors
that have been heavily regulated in the past under the assumption that they were natural monopolies. With a new law
for public concessions since 1995 and the amendments to the
Constitution, it has been possible to create a new regulatory
framework for these sectors.
The challenge for the near future is to facilitate cooperation between CADE and the newly-formed regulatory agencies.
A harmonious interaction will be crucial to avoid uncertainty
for the private investors and assure pro-competitive regulation.
Table 20 suggests the ideal division of labor between regulatory and competition authorities. Some of the specific legislation
has incorporated this complementary role between the agencies, such as in telecommunications.
TABLE 20

FRONTIERS

BETWEEN

COMPETITION

AND

REGULATION
Several Market Structures

Perfect Competitio n- i Competitives Non-Competitives : Natural Monopoly

1CompetitiQjn Policy

-

.

. .Regulation
-..- -

___________________
_

2. International Cooperation
There are obvious advantages to cooperating with other
national agencies. Gains in terms of knowledge and experience
can be enormous.
However, there are two additional factors to consider in
order to understand why international cooperation must be-
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come a priority at this point in time:
i) In contrast to the jurisprudence of the 1960s and 1970s,
there are more and more cases that not only present the
same characteristics in the Brazilian market, but in other
markets as well; they constitute in reality a cross-border
merger or a generalized conduct. Therefore, the potential for
inconsistent decisions among different national agencies is
high, requiring an increasing degree of coordination. The
search for consistency among various national jurisdictions is
even more important due to the lack of an international code
as discussed before; and
ii) the frequency of cross-border transactions poses the problem of transaction costs that firms incur when they have to
comply with so many applications and bureaucratic timetables. Efforts to harmonize particular requirements (e.g., for
merger review) could be useful even without a more profound
convergence in the legislation.

IV. ASPECTS OF THE MERCOSUR EXPERIENCE
The Fortaleza Protocol signed in December of 1996 bears
great similarity with the Brazilian law and represented an
important step in the formation of the Customs Union.
The Fortaleza Protocol resulted from a discussion process
started with the harmonization agenda comprised in Decision
21/94, as indicated in Table 21.
TABLE 21

COMPETITION POLICY IN MERCOSUR
1994

1996

1997-98

Decision No. 21/94
Decision No. 18/96
(Fortaleza Protocol)
Protocol Ratification
And Regulation
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As usually happens in documents of such nature, the Protocol may be improved in the future, mainly from its application and, in some cases, upon the proper regulation provided
for in article 9. Enforcement will commence when it is regulated and ratified by the national legislatures.
The document seems adequate in three areas:
* adoption of the rule of reason avoiding the rigid criteria of
per se illicit;

* incorporation, in article 7, of a timetable for the implementation of a merger review system within the regional bloc;
and
* cooperation mechanisms among the national competition
agencies.
A.

ChallengesAhead

However, there is still a long way to go in order to achieve
an effective competition policy in MERCOSUR. As in other
Latin American countries, the MERCOSUR members face two
main challenges that transcend the mere harmonization of the
legal texts.
First, as in the case of Brazil, there is not a widespread
culture of competition in the other MERCOSUR members.
There is in fact less tradition in terms of antitrust legislation
and jurisprudence.
The second challenge partially arises from the first. The
public and private sectors are not equipped to assure compliance with the legal determinations. The legal and executive
departments of the MERCOSUR companies do not know basic
aspects of the competition legislation of the mature countries
and of their own domestic markets. The public agencies lack
sufficient human and material resources.
Such obstacles pose difficulties for the Protocol implementation. One of the most severe problems is the slow pace of the
decision-making process. Relatively simple administrative
claims take years to be settled, encumbering the companies
and generating legal insecurity and bureaucratic opacity. It is
urgent to incorporate the rhythm of the competition agencies to
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the dynamism of the economic life; it is urgent to substitute
the economic time for the "bureaucratic time."
In addition to such challenges it is necessary to implement
the competition legislation in a very different historical context
from that which inspired the first legal texts of the United
States and Canada and, after the Second World War, of the
European countries. Indeed, the concern with the functioning
of the markets occurs during a time of deep productive restructuring of small and medium-sized economies in a process of
trade liberalization. The understanding of such phenomena, as
well as the flexible application of the national legislation are
essential in order to make competition authorities accelerate,
and not delay, the economic changes MERCOSUR economies
are undergoing.
If the above description seems close to the realities of
Brazil and Argentina, which already have applying legislation
and national agencies, the challenges are even bigger in Uruguay and Paraguay, which do not have competition laws.
B.

The Importance of Technical Cooperation

The importance of technical cooperation has already been
emphasized. It deals not only with the establishment of written rules, but also with the feasibility of its practical implementation.
This point constitutes one of the peculiarities of competition policy in comparison with the great majority of issues that
form the sub-regional agenda. In contrast with the arrangement that led to the Common Foreign Tariff, the case is not to
define commitment intervals from objective parameters, or to
establish standardization of procedures or measures, as could
be the case in several other MERCOSUR Technical Groups.
The integration success in the area of competition requires
not only similar rules, but convergence in its understanding.
Such goals may only be achieved with the development of the
jurisprudence and the permanent interaction among the competition agencies of the region.
In that sense, the cooperation that is being developed
between CADE and the National Commission of Competition
Protection of Argentina is crucial. Those two agencies agreed
on a common work plan, involving the exchange of staff, organization of seminars and workshops and, most important, the
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discussion of common cases and the participation of observers
in the sessions of both institutions.
Equally important are the initiatives, in the scope of the
private sector, of approximation among antitrust professionals
of Brazil and Argentina and other countries, which could result
in the formation of a supra-natural association similar to the
Brazilian Institute of the Competition and Consumption Relations (IBRAC) of Brazil.
C. A Few Guidelinesfor the Protocol Regulation
Several questions will have to be settled in order to consolidate competition policy in MERCOSUR, many of which shall
be approached in the context of regulation of the Fortaleza
Protocol. The following points are worth mentioning:
D.

JurisdictionDelimitation

The task to unequivocally establish jurisdictional definition criteria to the national organisms, vis-A-vis the Intergovernmental Commission of Competition Policy (CIDC) is not
trivial. It is noted that any uncertainty in this area may generate uncertainty with dissenting views on whether a process
should be forwarded by means of the national agency, or by the
institutional channels provided for in the Fortaleza Protocol.
In certain litigations, a jurisdiction could be used in opposition to another, as a way to appeal a decision presumably
unfavorable. Problems of such nature could naturally result in
conflicts between MERCOSUR and national agencies generating legal uncertainty.
In order to avoid them, it is required:
* to establish clear methodological criteria for jurisdictional
definition; and
* to build competition policy upon the cooperation among
national agencies, thereby avoiding undesirable rivalry
among the latter and the MERCOSUR decision bodies.
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"Economic Time" Versus "BureaucraticTime"

The protocol implementation could aggravate the problems
already existing in the national agencies, should due care not
be taken.
Table 22 contains a description of the procedures of the
Protocol. The information and decisions flow seem to be essential in the relations among:
" the national agencies and CIDC; and
" CIDC and the hierarchical structure of MERCOSUR, particularly the Trade Commission.

TABLE 22

THE FORTALEZA PROTOCOL

Petition made to the national agency responsible forthe Protocol application or de officio
Preliminary Technical Evaluation by the National Agency that applies the Protocol

Sending to the Competition Committee
Terminates the accusation

of the
referendum
adTrade
Commiaaion

Begins investigation establishing

investigation list
TInvestigations are led by the national

agency of application in which the accused is located
Trade Commission

Committee emits decision

ad referendum ofCCM

I
I
]

CCM emits guidelines indicating appropriate sanction
Sanctiona are applied by the national agency

in which the effects of the infraction were verified

Indeed, if the CIDC instructions are not issued with clarity
and understood and assimilated in the national jurisdictions,
there is a high risk of lack of uniformity and delay. An excessive delay in the ratification of decisions ad referendum of
CIDC by the Trade Commission would be equally worrisome.
TABLE 23

i
°i I--titaH
°°°CO

POSSIBLE DECISION INSTANCES OF THE FORALEZA
PROTOCOL

Fortaleza Protocol

Brasilia Protocol
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Table 23 shows the successive stages for dispute resolution. If proper routines are not created, it is reasonable to
suppose that the resolution of competition questions may become slow.
The efficiency of the system will depend crucially on the
capacity of the national bodies to be provided with the resources required to accelerate the administrative proceedings. Note
that the arbitration chambers mechanism anticipated in the
Brasilia Protocol may constitute a useful mechanism for conflict solution.
F.

Consensus CriterionVersus JudgingNature

There is a natural tension between the judging nature of
CIDC and the adoption of the consensus criterion. The latter,
however, constitutes the basic decision mechanism in the scope
of the Customs Union.
G. Limit to the Degree of Autonomy
The inter-governmental nature of CDIC and its subordinated position in the MERCOSUR power structure prevents
higher autonomy in the decision stage.
V. PERSPECTIVES OF COMPETITION POLICY
TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL MATURITY

IN

BRAZIL:

The previous sections suggest a few priorities for the competition authorities of Brazil and MERCOSUR.
With regard to Brazil, the agenda should include three
major points:
1.

Consolidationof Stages I and II:
* improvement of the investigative capacity in conduct;
* improvement of merger control; and
" continuation of the work of competition advocacy with emphasis on the Judiciary.
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2. Entering Stage III
" operational agreements with the regulatory agencies; and
" systematic cooperation with other national jurisdictions.
3. InstitutionalBuilding of CADE
" modernization of the internal rules; and
" staff training.
With regard to MERCOSUR, in the past, the attraction of
foreign investments derived mainly from the possibility of
advantages in the domestic market associated with protection.
However, the process of globalization changed this picture and
all MERCOSUR economies were subject to comprehensive
processes of financial and trade liberalization.
The difficulties pointed out in Section IV are natural in
the consolidation process of a Customs Union, and do not justify skepticism about the Fortaleza Protocol. Four guidelines
seem to be required to face them:
* the gradual construction of the competition policy in
MERCOSUR must occur from the strengthening of the national agencies. Any parallelism between the CIDC activities
and those of the national agencies must be avoided;
* maximum priority must be attributed to the institutional
building of the latter ones upon proper provision of resources
by the member States and exchange of experiences through
technical cooperation;
e it is important to accelerate the decision process through
non-bureaucratic procedures; and
* it is crucial to create a tradition of technical excellence of
CIDC, attributing to it, in practice, a higher degree of relative autonomy. The latter is not necessarily conquered by
law. It requires the building up of a reputation of technical
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excellence.
In the global economy, regions attract foreign investment
through legal certainty. Special privileges are less important
than a stable environment and respect for the due process of
law.
Brazil and MERCOSUR have taken important steps in
that direction. Their success continues to depend on a complex
historical process, in which technical cooperation and jurisprudence formation constitute essential ingredients.

